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FOREWORD

The American military, particularly the Army, plays a
modest but significant role in helping the nations of
Sub-Saharan Africa build regional security systems. Some
of the most important U.S. efforts focus on assisting
Africans as they improve their civil-military relations,
strategic planning methods, and defense budgeting
procedures. All of these are interlinked: stable
civil-military relations and coherent strategic planning
depend on a transparent budgeting process that builds
consensus among military and civilian leaders, and ties the
allocation of resources to strategic objectives, military
missions, and threats.
In this monograph, Martin Rupiya, Director of the
University of Zimbabwe’s Centre for Defence Studies, and
Daniel Henk of the Air War College provide one of the first
comprehensive studies of defense budgeting practices in
Africa. They assess both the problems with these practices,
and fruitful avenues of reform. By doing so, they provide a
solid roadmap both for African leaders and for Americans
concerned with the development of greater security in the
region.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this
monograph as a contribution to the analysis of the Army
role in regional security.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

The interests of the United States would be well-served
in the emergence of a stable, secure and prosperous Africa, a
fact acknowledged in the rhetoric of the current and
previous Administrations. Since the end of the Cold War,
the United States has been increasingly active in efforts to
promote political and economic reform in African countries,
including programs to democratize African security sectors.
While the military (and other security force) establishments
in Africa have many problems—and pose challenges to
ongoing democratization efforts—few challenges are as
potentially significant for good or ill as that of defense sector
funding. The ability of African countries to provide the
secure environment necessary for social and economic
development requires the creation of the right kind of
security establishments, legitimized by democratic
processes, and empowered with adequate resources. It is
very much in the U.S. interest to assist African societies in
reform both of the security sector and of security sector
financing.
The official data about African defense expenditure is
scanty at best, often deliberately concealed and rarely
provides the full story. At the same time, African leaders
face increasing pressure from external partners and, in
some cases, from their own populations, to reduce military
forces and military spending. However, with a few egregious
exceptions, African countries spend surprisingly little on
defense—possibly less than is prudent. Military
establishments typically are under-funded for basic
military requirements, and spend an overwhelming and
crippling proportion of their budgets on salaries and
personnel allowances. They tend to be oriented against
domestic rather than external threats, and tend to serve
regimes in power rather than societies at large. (Though
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with over 50 separate countries on the continent, it is
dangerous to generalize too broadly.)
What generally is missing in African countries is a
transparent process, based upon broad national concensus,
for defining security, formulating coherent national
security strategy, allocating resources based on that
strategy, then effectively overseeing implementation.
African countries generally have not established national
consensus on the nature of security they desire and the ways
and means to achieve that security. This commonly results
in defense establishments very poorly suited to any
conceivable threat, unaccountable to the society at large
and riddled with graft. Decisions on defense funding tend to
come out of a small elite of government insiders, or from
jockeying by major institutions (including the military) for a
share of the national resources. Neither system results in a
good return on the investment in defense.
That said, many African countries now are engaged in
some process of government—including security sector—
reform. These efforts are being assisted by a variety of
external partners. There is widespread acknowledgement
that reforms will not be quick and certainly will not be easy,
but the potential results are well worth the effort. Part of
the solution lies in the improvement of institutions and
techniques for more efficient planning and more effective
oversight of defense expenditure. But a more fundamental
issue is the democratization of the whole process of deciding
national priorities and allocating resources based on a true
national consensus.
The United States is one actor in this critical drama, and
the Department of Defense (DoD) is playing a key role. DoD
activities include the long-standing Intenational Military
Education and Training (IMET) program that trains foreign
military personnel in a variety of skills, the Africa Crisis
Response Initiative (ACRI), essentially a bilateral,
tactical-level peace operations training program, various
initiatives by the U.S. European and U.S. Central
viii

Commands and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies
(ACSS). The ACSS provides an exceptional forum in which
senior African leaders—including those from civil society—
can analyze and debate key issues that bear on defense
sector reform. Though a relatively new program, ACSS has
won wide acceptance and high praise from Africans. This
clearly is one program that should be encouraged and
enhanced.
A number of other innovative, relatively low-cost
programs also could contribute substantial value to reform
of defense funding in Africa. These could include targeted
employment of contractors with unique expertise and an
internship program in the United States for small numbers
of African officials involved in defense budgeting.
The United States has a considerable long-term stake in
the success of ongoing reform efforts in Africa—including
those pertaining to the funding of security. Modest current
U.S. investments could yield a substantial future payoff.
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FUNDING DEFENSE:
CHALLENGES OF BUYING MILITARY
CAPABILITY
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Introduction.
U.S. security interests in Sub-Saharan Africa do not
require the commitment of military forces in large-scale
conventional operations, and are unlikely to do so in the
foreseeable future. But the United States does have
interests on the continent, including the resolution of
ongoing conflict and development of secure, stable, and
prosperous societies committed to working as partners with
Washington on common problems.1 These interests can be
promoted by assisting African leaders in the revision and
reform of their security environment. A key to this
end—and an integral part of Africa’s movement toward
stable governments with popular support—is the reform of
civil-military relations. African militaries have often
preyed on the citizens of their countries, and typically are
much more interested in securing regimes than societies at
large. Since the late 1960s, military intervention in politics
has been common and effective civilian control of the
military rare, features that work against transparent,
accountable, effective governance. Africans themselves,
along with their external partners, are engaged in a variety
of efforts to promote governmental reform, including reform
of security sectors. It is very much in the interest of the
United States to support such efforts.
Healthy civil-military relations are not easy for any
society to achieve or maintain. The relations between a
national security sector and a larger public are complex and
culturally peculiar, reflecting unique historical
antecedents. Even when models of civil-military relations
are good in one society, they cannot be easily exported to
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others. They always require more than mere restraint on
the part of the armed forces. They tend to be improved by
coherent and reasonably transparent processes for the
development of budgeting that links military funding to
missions, that generates public support for defense
expenditures, and that leaves the military confident that it
is receiving adequate resources. But in Africa, open,
coherent procedures for developing defense budgets have
been rare. One of the most valuable things that the United
States can do to help shape the African security
environment is to assist the region’s political and military
leaders in their efforts to reform defense spending.
Because budgeting for security sectors in Africa has long
been an informal and closed process, it is poorly understood.
Both African leaders and Americans seeking to assist them
must overcome this lack of understanding. The authors
address that problem by summarizing some of the
challenges faced by African policymakers in determining
financial allocations for their security organizations,
particularly the uniformed military. The authors consider
general patterns in the ways in which policy decisions on
security force financing are made and implemented in
Africa. The monograph is not intended as an economic
treatise; rather, it is about relationships, choices, and the
ramifications of those choices.
The authors focus on the armed forces—the military
establishment—of the African state. However, given the
fact that African political decisionmakers may not always
view the armed forces as their most important and relevant
security agency, the authors expand the analysis to include
(at least in passing) other important state security organs,
such as the police and intelligence services.
Patterns in the ways African leaders conceptualize
“security” and decide on the security force capabilities they
need are of interest. Of equal concern is the way in which
leaders choose between what traditionally has been
regarded as “security” and other national priorities in
2

allocating resources, and the degree to which these choices
are informed by the wider society. Patterns in the allocation
process (including oversight of spending) also are
considered. A final question has to do with the result—the
output—of security force funding in African contexts. The
authors identify particular problems and challenges and
offer some suggestions for attenuating them.
Before exploring these issues in more depth, two
cautions are offered. First, the act of generalizing about a
continent as large and diverse as Africa is fraught with
danger. What is true for Sierra Leone cannot be assumed to
be true of South Africa; Ethiopia is vastly different than
Zambia. Second, despite appearances to the contrary in the
professional literature, “countries” are abstractions and
cannot decide anything. Sentient beings, not “countries,”
make policy decisions. In some African countries, the group
that makes such decisions on behalf of the country is very
small. While the authors will use the common convention,
describing choices that “countries” make in Africa, lingering
closely behind the discussion is the question: who really
speaks for the “country”?
At the outset, it should be acknowledged that there is no
rich body of literature on African defense economics.
Individual African scholars and some African organizations
are beginning to address this subject, notably in South
Africa. However, African researchers face daunting
obstacles, ranging from egregious lack of access to official
documents and officials in many instances, to the possibility
of repercussions from authorities. Even in African countries
that receive generally high marks for democratic
commitment, officials tend to treat data about defense
issues as privileged information and its disclosure as
treasonous.2 One intention of the authors is to stimulate
debate about the subject and about access to data. A
longer-term objective is to assist African societies in their
efforts to make the processes of funding security more
efficient, productive and transparent.
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This kind of analysis begs several much more important
background questions. At the center of these larger
questions is the definition of “security.” For the purposes of
this monograph, the authors define it as the protection of
what the political decisionmakers consider to be important
and valuable. The primary questions here are: “What do
you value, and what will you do to protect it?” Or, put a
different way, the question is “What is security, and how
much of it is enough?” Here, it is important to identify who
in a society has the prerogative of defining what is
important and valuable. For instance, if the society is ruled
by a small, unrepresentative elite, maintaining the political
power of a regime may be the most important value. In a
society with more democratic structures, protecting the
economy and safeguarding economic development
programs may receive greater emphasis. Again, if key
security decisions exclusively are made by a threatened
regime, no degree of “security”—however coercive to the
society at large—may be “enough.” This leads to the issue of
society’s other priorities, and begs several additional
questions: Besides security, what are the society’s basic
interests? How are they funded in comparison to “security”?
Whose voices are heard in this decision?
The issue of “threat” is related to “security.” The
question here is: What threatens the things that society
values? Here, too, are a number of subsidiary questions.
Who determines the nature and extent of “threat,” and what
process is used in this assessment? What proportion of the
society’s resources are the policymakers willing to devote to
attenuate the threat? Or alternatively, how much risk are
they prepared to accept?
In recent years, the definition of “security” has
broadened in Africa and elsewhere.3 For instance, it now is
common to hear policymakers speak of “economic security,”
or “environmental security.”4 Since 1993, the international
conversation has featured increasing use of the term
“human security,” stimulated in great degree by that year’s
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human
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Development report.5 The following year’s report defined
the concept in greater detail, giving it a very broad charter.6
It is readily evident that a society’s security forces are not
suited to all of the tasks specified in these new definitions of
“security” and often are inadequate to provide all of the
security desired by members of the society. If security is
attained, it must include the contributions of public and
private sector actors other than simply the security organs
of the state.
The questions about financing security in Africa, as
elsewhere, are tied to the broader questions of security
strategy. Before considering how African countries allocate
resources to their security forces, it is very appropriate to
ask whether they undergo some process of developing such
strategy. A standard approach would begin with
identification and prioritization of interests and an
assessment of threats to those interests. This would then
lead to development of policies that marshal the various
instruments of state power—diplomatic, economic,
informational, and security force/military —to protect and
promote the interests, carefully balancing desired ends with
feasible ways and available means. The latter point is
especially important: strategy that is not grounded in fiscal
reality is meaningless. Budgeting is a necessary component
of strategic planning.
Funding Security: African Realities.
According to the best available data, in 1996, the 48
countries of sub-Saharan Africa collectively spent over $10
billion on their military establishments. For the modal
country in the region, this amounted to about 2 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP), a reduction from the late
1980s, when the modal country in the region spend more
like about 4 percent of its GDP on its armed forces.7 This
compares to a world-wide average for the mid 1990s of about
5 percent of GDP devoted to defense.8 Given the significant
security challenges to African states,9 levels of defense
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spending for most African countries are surprisingly low,
both in relative and absolute terms. In fact, given the
expense of maintaining professional military
establishments anywhere in the world, it may be
appropriate to question what military capability a typical
African country could expect to purchase with an annual
defense budget of $200 million or less.10 That said, a very
modest defense budget in Africa could be large enough to
significantly reduce a state’s ability to fund other critical
national priorities.
These data are by no means the whole story. Much of the
real budgetary data from African countries is shrouded in
secrecy and obscurity and should be viewed with a healthy
dose of skepticism.11 National leaders in countries like
Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, or
Zimbabwe can divert significant resources to security forces
in ways that are entirely shielded from public scrutiny and
accountability.12 Funds that contribute directly to the
security forces requirements—such as construction of
facilities—can be obscured in budgets of otherwise
unrelated ministries. For that matter, funds allocated in
military budgets can be diverted to nondefense uses,
including graft. Some African military establishments are
so austerely funded that personnel are obliged to rely on
petty commerce or farming (often performed by “dependents” of military members) to make ends meet—so, in a
sense, depending on the informal economy to “fund” defense
needs like salaries. Some African countries operate on
“cash budgets” in which ministries of the state are allocated
funding on a month-by-month basis, based upon revenues
available (which cannot be accurately anticipated).13 In
short, no one really knows what many African countries
spend on defense, including senior officials of the countries
themselves. Calculating the amounts spent on the
nonmilitary services—particularly the intelligence
services—is even more problematic.
That said, it is possible to make “order of magnitude”
assessments of spending. If Malawi and Zimbabwe can be
6

cited as valid examples, in the mid 1990s, African countries
tended to spend 4-6 percent of GDP on the security
services—the military, police, and intelligence services—
designed to provide external and internal security. While
not large in absolute terms, security budgets are a
significant proportion of public sector economic resources in
African states. Hence, while it still is appropriate to ask
how much “security” these outlays purchase, it is
appropriate to ask if policymakers explored nonmilitary
options for protecting security interests. It also is useful to
ask if the voice of the average African citizen was heard in
making the funding choices. It is even more appropriate to
ask what the citizen received for his or her country’s
security forces expenditure.
One of the most significant differences between African
countries and the established democracies in the West is the
degree to which African national policymakers consider
their most serious security threats to be internal rather
than external to the country’s borders.14 Internal stability
cannot be taken for granted by most African leaders, a fact
that has significant ramifications for choices about resource
allocation and roles and missions of the security forces. An
obvious corollary to the problem of internal stability is that
the capability to assure internal security—be it found in
intelligence, police, or military communities—may be far
more important to political decisionmakers than that
dedicated to security from external threats. Another
corollary is that the cost of purchasing capabilities for
internal security may be significantly different than that for
external security.
Whether the topic is internal and external security,
military capability, or another interest of the state, most
African countries lack the resources for near-term
realization of any of their most significant priorities. This
imposes excruciating choices on national policymakers
under the best of circumstances. But it also has significant
implications for internal security. Access to the very limited
resources of the state—including, particularly, public sector
7

employment—can take on such importance that
competitors (and those already in power) are tempted to
resort to any methods to attain and maintain a privileged
position. Losing that position can result in destitution or
worse. This is true for military as well as civilian
government employees.
Since the late 1980s, external donors increasingly have
pressured African governments to reduce funding for the
security sector—particularly for the armed forces. This has
been expressed in the insistence on the so-called “three Ds”:
democratize, demobilize, and downsize. An objective of this
pressure has been to increase the resources available for
other priorities of African national development. While wellmeaning, and sometimes very appropriate, this pressure is
not always wise. African development depends to a large
degree on an ability to attract capital (and prevent capital
flight). This, in turn, requires security from crime,
insurgent groups, and environmental threats. Ironically, to
provide the security necessary to attract investment—and
promote sustainable economic development—African
countries may need to invest more, not less, in the security
sector. (Significantly, because of an egregious crime threat,
South Africa now spends more on its national police than on
its military establishment.15) And there certainly is room
for more efficient utilization in Africa of resources already
devoted to security.
In the case of defense spending, lack of materiel
resources almost inevitably means that African military
establishments are under-funded for basic military
requirements such as pay and allowances, personnel
services (e.g., billeting and medical treatment), training,
and acquisition of necessary materiel. A significant
deficiency in military funding has obvious implications for
military readiness and military capability in general. This
is recognized even in the African popular press.16 Nor are
the richer countries exempt from these problems. An audit
of the Nigerian military conducted in 2000 found over 75
percent of its Army equipment to be inoperative, and all of
8

its Air Force fighter jets were grounded. Military training
virtually had ceased. And this is a country with a
sophisticated military establishment.17
Severe under-funding for salaries and benefits
encourages military personnel to abuse their access to
government resources. For example, in some military
establishments, senior officers are provided official vehicles
that they use for very personal transportation needs. (One
author was informed of a mid-level officer in a southern
African country who had engaged his army’s engineers to
build a very nice house for him in an upper-class
neighborhood—at government expense. This apparently
was not an isolated instance in the country in question.)
Other military personnel supplement their income by
taking on second jobs—sometimes using military resources.
In the worst instances, in countries like Democratic
Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique,
security force personnel “shake down” hapless citizens on
the street or in “security sweeps.”18 The state in these cases
partially has delegated its role of funding defense to the
informal economy. It is very important to note here,
however, that a number of African armies exhibit a notable
discipline and professional demeanor despite great
austerity in resources.
Discussion of military spending in Africa frequently
results in accusations of corruption and graft. In some
cases, these accusations are well-founded. However,
suspicions of corruption taint even those transactions that
are not corrupt. Part of this is due to a general lack of
transparency in use of government funds: insistence on
secrecy for secrecy’s sake.
An Unfortunate Legacy.
The lack of resources touches a very key problem related
to defense spending in Africa. In their present form, some
military establishments are far too large or far too small for
any viable role in their current security environment. Many
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are not well-configured for the kind of conflict—or other
roles—national leaders conceivably might want them to
play.19 Virtually all African countries inherited their
security establishments from pre-independence regimes or
insurgent organizations, neither of which provided a
security establishment well-suited to the new environment.
Few African countries have had the option of building a
national army “from scratch,” and few African countries
have had the option of abolishing their military
establishments.
This lack of resources also contributes to another
characteristic of many African governments: a reluctance to
engage in long-range strategic planning. The effects go well
beyond the security sector, of course, but they have a very
negative impact on organizations that require multi-year
planning for even the most basic efficiencies in acquisition
and maintenance of sophisticated materiel and training of
personnel. There is a very pronounced tendency to rely on
“muddling through somehow.” One clear result is
considerable waste and inefficiency; another is difficulty
achieving the synergy of men and materiel that military
operations require.
Security establishments are an important economic/
political constituency in many African states. Their
members depend for their livelihood on this form of state
employment in countries that have limited economic
opportunity. They cannot be taken for granted in the
distribution of state benefits. Their access to the means of
violence gives them a clout well out of proportion to their
actual numbers. This limits the options of senior
policymakers in making any fundamental change in the
nature of the security agencies or in their size and missions.
That said, there are many highly professional African
military leaders who desperately want to improve their
country’s capabilities and have a clear idea of the need. The
commander of the army of a large African country explained
to one author in the early 1990s that he would have been
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extremely happy to cut his 40,000-man army in half if he
could find the means to deploy the smaller force rapidly to
his country’s borders. In the long term, despite the outlay
for new military materiel, this would have saved his country
an enormous amount of money. However, his country had
no short-term ability to acquire the needed mobility, and
could not accept the risk of the unguarded frontiers. Though
the commander did not mention it, his country’s economy
could not easily absorb the 20,000 former soldiers released
in such a downsizing. Unless very carefully handled, such
an act could have been destabilizing for the country and
certainly would have been a political liability for the ruling
party.
The general lack of resources also bears on African
options for acquisition of materiel. Defense industries in
Africa—save for those of South Africa and Egypt—are very
small. African countries generally have acquired their
military materiel from a variety of external sources, some as
a legacy from an earlier colonial regime, some from various
Cold War patrons, some as donations of surplus equipment
from the developed world. Much of this equipment is old,
much is of it is poorly suited to contemporary roles and
missions. Often, equipment from different sources proves
incompatible in the field. Spare parts are unavailable or too
expensive. Yet replacing the equipment often is beyond the
funding capacity of the state. The result is continued
piecemeal replacement from different sources, perpetuating
the problem. Another result is graveyards of unusable
equipment around many African military bases.
Where Does the Money (and other Resources) Come
From?
While virtually all African countries struggle to obtain
the resources to maintain their security forces, the sources
of those resources vary considerably. In general, some
proportion of the funding for security services derives from
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the normal revenues raised by the state and extracted from
citizens and businesses as taxes.
International financial institutions generally do not now
provide loans for purchase of African military capability,
although some governments (particularly in the former
“East Bloc”) seem willing to provide credit on favorable
terms for purchases of military materiel. That said, any
form of economic assistance to an African country
potentially could compensate for state resources diverted to
the security sector.
In several cases, African governments enjoy access to
foreign exchange revenues from lucrative extractive
industries (as in Nigeria or Angola). These provide
substantial options not available to other countries,
allowing the Angolan government, for example, to purchase
significant quantities of sophisticated military materiel
from overseas sources.20
The ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo
has featured another source of funding for at least some of
the intervening armies since 1998. Uganda may have
supported its Congo adventure by trafficking in Congolese
gold and diamonds,21 while Zimbabwean entrepreneurs
connected to senior officials may have obtained lucrative
access to Congolese minerals in exchange for Zimbabwe’s
backing of the Kabila regime.22 These examples point to a
troubling issue: the prospect that African leaders in the
future may be tempted to commit military forces to regional
conflicts in the expectation of significant financial reward.
However, it is worth noting that neither Uganda nor
Zimbabwe have been able to fully finance the human and
materiel costs of their Congo intervention with Congolese
resources.23 Significantly, in neither case were the citizens
of the countries consulted about the political or financial
implications of the interventions.
Another source of funding for some African military
establishments is the United Nations (U.N.). Several
African countries have participated for decades in
12

international peacekeeping operations conducted by the
U.N., notably Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria,
Tunisia, and Senegal. Many other African countries have
participated in one or more U.N. peacekeeping operations in
the 1990s. Both the individual soldier and the participating
government are well-remunerated for participation in U.N.
peacekeeping. This includes a monthly payment of over
U.S.$1,000 per soldier to the contributing government, and
other allowances paid directly to the soldier on site.24 One
knowledgeable observer calls attention to the economic
benefit enjoyed by the Ghanaian military because of the
consistent, high level of Ghana’s participation in U.N.
operations.25 However, African states do not necessarily
return the U.N. peacekeeping reimbursements to the
defense budget, a fact which has generated civil-military
friction in some countries.26
During the Cold War era, a number of African countries
received quantities of military materiel as grant aid, or
purchased through very long-term “soft loans.” In the wake
of the Cold War, few patrons now are willing to provide
African countries much in the way of military grant aid,
though there are a few exceptions. In the 1990s, the United
States provided light observer aircraft and C-130 transport
aircraft to several countries. It also provided quantities of
nonlethal excess defense materiel to individual countries
and to the West African peacekeeping force in Liberia
(ECOMOG).27 Still, since 1990, neither the United States
nor any other external patron has donated enough military
materiel to substantially enhance the military capability of
any Sub-Saharan African country.
In contrast to military materiel, African countries have
continued to receive external support for the training of
military personnel.28 While this support certainly falls short
of the overall need, significant numbers of African military
personnel—mainly of officer rank—are invited to training
courses offered by countries outside of Africa. Several
countries—particularly France, the United Kingdom, and
the People’s Republic of China—maintain cadres of military
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trainers in Africa.29 Denmark has provided funding and
military personnel for peacekeep- ing training—and
extensive support in development of a peacekeeping
training institute in Zimbabwe.30 This form of external
support provides African militaries with a much greater
capability to train officers than would be available through
national resources alone.
Finally, it is important to note that resources to sustain
military establishments in Africa also are derived from the
informal economy. Salary costs are defrayed in some
instances by allowing the use of government resources—
such as vehicles—for personal business, or by turning a
blind eye to graft. In other cases, it simply is assumed that
military personnel will rely on outside entrepreneurial
activity—or family farms—to make ends meet. 3 1
Deficiencies in military medical care often require service
personnel to seek assistance outside official channels. In
many cases, military personnel in the final stages of AIDs
simply are sent home to die.
Deciding on the Desired Capability.
How do African countries decide what to spend on their
security services? This is related to the question: What are
the key determining factors behind the spending decisions?
Because of Africa’s political diversity, there are no universal
answers to these questions.32 South Africa, for example, has
a sophisticated methodology similar in many respects to the
Western democracies.33 Nigeria seems to be experimenting
with the development of security strategy much like that of
the United States. The Democratic Republic of Congo, by
contrast, appears to have little or no coherent system for
calculating and embarking on defense expenditures other
than the ad-hoc decisions of a small group around the Head
of State. For the majority of African states, it does not
appear that the decisions on levels of defense spending—
however made—are tied to any solid analysis of the kinds of
capabilities desired of the armed forces.
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Again, however, there are exceptions. Angola and
Eritrea stood out in the late 1990s for the large proportion of
national resources devoted to defense (15.1 percent and 22.8
percent of GDP, respectively, for 1996).34 In both cases, the
national leadership clearly had a strong sense of threat and
a clear picture of the military capability it required to
attenuate that threat. What was not clear in either case is
that the national leadership had carefully balanced the
need for security against other competing priorities for state
resources. Nor, in the case of Angola, does it appear that the
citizenry was in any way consulted in national choices about
defense spending.
What generally is missing in African countries is a
transparent process, based upon broad national consensus,
for defining security, formulating national security
strategy, and then allocating resources to this strategy. In
other words, African societies by and large have not
established national consensus on the nature of security
they desire and ways and means to achieve that security;
nor have they been able to formulate and translate a clear
vision into viable policy in regard to security allocations. To
be sure, the attentive publics in African countries tend to be
smaller than in the Western democracies, and most African
states lack a large, educated middle class. Engaging the
common citizen in a debate about security priorities may
seem fruitlessly difficult even in countries striving to
implement democratic reform. But the national leadership
of most African countries tends to be reluctant to engage
even their communities of intellectuals—interested
individuals in academe, the professions and commerce—in
such debate. (It is important to note here that South Africa
is a notable exception to this generalization.35)
The authors’ interviews of African civil servants from a
wide range of African countries indicate that decisions on
funding priorities tend to be made by one of three processes.
In the first case, a small elite of senior government insiders
determines the national priorities and makes the
fundamental decisions about resource allocation. Perhaps
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an extreme of this form was that of the highly personalized,
patronage-based Mobutu regime in Zaire,36 although the
successor governments seem to preserve much the same
decisionmaking style. This methodology of resource
allocation is by no means restricted to the Congo. It can be
found in much less authoritarian states, and can take some
innovative forms. For instance, parliamentary committees
charged with oversight of national financing can be stacked
with party insiders who loyally do the bidding of senior
government policymakers.
In the second case, allocations result from consensus
among the senior leaders of the large bureaucracies of the
state. In this case, the military establishment is one of the
“senior partners” which jockeys for its “fair share” of the
resources. In these cases, the previous year’s budget tends
to be the base line, and institutional pressures inhibit
significant departure from previous practice, whether or not
the security environment has significantly changed.
Neither this nor the first process lends itself to a careful
definition of desired military capabilities nor to a logical
allocation of appropriate resources.
A final case includes only a handful of African countries.
Here, the national budgeting process is relatively
transparent. There is genuine debate about national
priorities and resource allocations. The funding for security
is subjected to somewhat the same scrutiny as funding for
other national priorities. Preeminent in this category is
South Africa. However, Botswana, Namibia, Ghana, and
(recently) Nigeria seem also to be reasonably close to this
categorization.37
However the national policymakers go about the process
of deciding what to spend on security, it is worth returning
to the issue of the desired output. Here, the question
remains: What is the expenditure intended to do? In many
cases in Africa, the answer is not self-evident; assuring
security sector capabilities may not be a primary purpose of
the allocation. Rather, the decisions are rooted in the
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economic, political or even personal agenda of the senior
national decisionmakers.
On What Is the Money Generally Spent?
Whatever method is used to calculate defense
allocations, certain types of expenses are characteristic of
military establishments. Different countries have
somewhat different ways of describing the categories of this
expenditure, but generally reflect some combination of the
following:
• Personnel costs, to include recruiting and maintenance
of military and civilian personnel.
• Operations, training and maintenance costs, to include
the routine peacetime expenses of keeping a large
organization running and prepared to perform contingency
roles.
• Infrastructure costs, to include construction and repair
of bases, firing ranges, and headquarters.
• Procurement/capital costs, involving the acquisition of
military materiel and the various programs involved in this
activity.
• Contingency costs, involving the additional expenses
when forces are deployed in consonance with military
missions.
Before attempting to account for ways in which African
states allocate defense funds, it is important to recall the
difficulty in Africa of obtaining explicit, reliable funding
data. With some exceptions, African governments (or
military establishments) rarely publish breakdowns of
defense expenditures, making it very difficult to establish
an empirical baseline for Africa, and there almost certainly
is wide variation in detail. In addition, the use of cash
budgeting in some African countries and the allocation of
“off budget” funding to the security sector in others make
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formal budgets suspect.
comments can be made.

However, several general

In most African militaries, an overwhelming proportion
of the budget goes to salaries and personnel allowances.38
(In one 1998 West African example available to the authors,
74 percent was allocated to salaries and about 5 percent was
allocated to operations, maintenance, and training. In
recent years, Zimbabwe has spent some 68 percent of its
defense budget on personnel salaries and allowances. This
seems a common pattern.) Typically, very small portions of
the military budget are allocated to infrastructure and
capital costs. The funds available for contingency
operations must generally be taken from other resources
available to the state.
The results of these allocations are military establishments which have difficulty funding unit training and
which are chronically short of ammunition, fuel, other basic
supplies, and spare parts. Infrastructure deteriorates
without the resources to maintain it. Work spaces and
living quarters are decayed and badly overcrowded.39
Ironically, despite the high proportion of defense resources
that typically go to military pay and allowances, personnel
reimbursements often do not provide an adequate standard
of living, particularly for junior officers and enlisted
personnel. Inadequate pay—or delayed pay—for military
personnel is a prime motivator of unrest in the military and
the basic source of a number of coups d’etat in Africa.40
Overseeing Military Spending.
Allocation of defense resources is one thing; overseeing
their use is quite another. Here again, African countries
reflect considerable difference in approach. Different levels
of oversight are important. One level would require the
ability to hold senior policymakers accountable for policy
choices that resulted in significant defense expenditure. At
another level, the ability to deter mid-level officials from
fraudulent or wasteful use of resources is important.
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In a few countries like South Africa, legislatures have
the mandate, interest, and expertise to monitor use of
defense resources and to call defense officials to account.
Several countries, such as Kenya, Senegal, and South
Africa, have robust civilian management in the defense
ministries that insists on a relatively high degree of
accountability for use of defense funds. Some African
countries, among them Nigeria, Uganda, and Zimbabwe,
have an independent press that has endeavored to call
attention to defense spending, even challenging
presidential policy decisions.
In general, however, senior African policymakers are not
consistently challenged on major decisions of resource
allocation for security force use. Senior leaders hide behind
a claim of “state secrets,” especially for paramilitary or
intelligence agencies with coercive internal security roles.
Mechanisms for preventing waste, fraud, and abuse in
security force spending are relatively weak, both in the
defense ministries and in the countries generally. Spending
can be an important form of patronage for authoritarian
leaders, who generally shun public scrutiny. Oversight
mechanisms autonomous from the executive branch also
would limit the options for use of military force. For
instance, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe probably could not
have deployed his country’s forces to the Democratic
Republic of Congo in late 1997 had he been held accountable
for the economic ramifications to Zimbabwe of that
deployment. Nigeria’s government probably could not have
sustained its participation in ECOMOG operations in
Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s had Nigeria’s
citizenry been consulted about that involvement.
With some exceptions, African countries lack effective
financial management information systems to monitor
spending. However, even with structures that should
provide some accountability, senior policymakers often
have the authority to override them. It is noteworthy that
Zimbabwe’s Comptroller and Auditor-General repeatedly
have called attention to irregularities in Zimbabwe’s
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defense spending, with little indication of government
interest in investigating wrongdoing or correcting the
abuse.
Weakness in defense resource accountability is
particularly pronounced in the realm of materiel
procurement. The problem is manifest at various levels.
The most basic deficiency is the lack of the kind of planning
that includes a realistic assessment of the security
environment and a serious effort to match ends, ways, and
means to logical procurement decisions.
In many parts of the world, senior policymakers can be
prone to squander national resources on expensive weapons
not out of military necessity but for their symbolic value,
and African countries are no exception. This probably was
the case in abortive Zimbabwean negotiations to purchase
sophisticated Soviet Mig-29 fighters in the late 1980s, or
Ethiopian and Eritrean acquisition of similar aircraft in the
late 1990s. Uganda’s purchase of a large quantity of 1950s
era tanks in the late 1990s may have been similarly
motivated. South Africa’s purchase of submarines and
Swedish jet fighters in 1999—at enormous public
expense—bore little discernible relevance to the external
threat, a fact debated in the national press.41
Except for South Africa and Egypt, defense industries in
Africa are very small scale. However, they do exist. A
number of African countries produce munitions and
assemble light weapons with parts from abroad. But even in
cases where military materiel could be locally procured,
African governments have been slow to take advantage of
this opportunity. A notorious recent example was Ugandan
purchase of military uniforms from the People’s Republic of
China, despite a significant textile industry in Uganda.
Only the key insiders involved in this purchase know if the
Chinese uniforms cost less than locally-made equivalents.
Competitive bidding for military materiel, while it does
occur in Africa, is relatively infrequent and rarely
transparent. Because of their constrained resources,
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African countries are prone to seek donations or
particularly favorable terms for weapons, even if the
resulting product is of marginal use. (This has made the
surplus weaponry and unscrupulous arms merchants of
Eastern Europe particularly attractive.) Perhaps more
worrisome is a tendency in some African countries to keep
military procurement “off-budget.” This lack of transparency makes it difficult hold procurement officials—and
senior policymakers—accountable for procurement
decisions.
Because of the limited oversight of procurement
processes, officials in many African countries have found
significant opportunity for graft. One notorious example
was the Zimbabwean purchase of a large quantity of
Spanish Santana light utility vehicles in the early 1990s,
despite the fact that similar vehicles at better prices were
available in the region. Soon after this purchase, the
Santana Corporation folded. With no available spare parts,
most of the vehicles now in Zimbabwe are inoperable.
Ironically, Zimbabwe has a relatively sophisticated
procurement establishment.
Defense Spending and Military Capability.
As noted earlier, African countries generally struggle to
find the resources to fund any of their national priorities,
including security. 42 Few African countries have a
transparent, coherent process for developing national
security strategy. Given these problems, it is very
appropriate to ask if the resources devoted by African
countries to “defense” result in a desired outcome. The
ultimate “output” of effective security strategy, good policy
planning, and adequate budgeting would be some measure
of security. But an intermediate output would be a defense
establishment of the right size, appropriately equipped,
well-led, sufficiently trained, and disciplined to fulfill the
expectations of the society.
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A simple question is relevant to defense spending
anywhere in the world: What capability is being purchased?
And this begs the question for policymakers: What do you
want your armed forces to be able to do? These questions get
at the heart of roles and missions for the military. They are
not idle questions. They have profound implications for
allocation of very scarce resources.
With the partial exception of the South African National
Defense Force, no military establishment in sub-Saharan
Africa could conduct the kind of multi-division, joint force
power projection that is characteristic of the larger Western
nations. Yet it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which
that capability would be necessary. Clearly, there are viable
military roles that African militaries do play well.43
Individual African countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Nigeria, and Zimbabwe have fielded impressively
sophisticated forces that have demonstrated an ability to
perform well in conventional military operations. Countries
like Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal have been cited
for excellence in international peacekeeping operations.
Botswana has used its military very successfully in
environmental security operations. The South African Air
Force performed heroically in rescue operations during the
flooding in Mozambique in March 2000.
Several sub-Saharan African countries stand out for the
competence and professionalism of their armed forces.
Among these are Senegal, Ghana, Kenya, Botswana, and
South Africa, each of which devotes a relatively modest
portion of its GDP to defense spending (1.8 percent, .07
percent, 2.0 percent, 3.1 percent and 1.7 percent,
respectively, in 1995). The level of funding devoted to a
military establishment in Africa is not in itself a
particularly good indicator of general professionalism or
proficiency. A variety of historical and social factors seem to
bear upon the role and relevance of the defense establishment in each country.44
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It is abundantly clear, however, that many African
military establishments do not provide a good return on the
nation’s defense investment. As an extreme example,
Zaire’s former dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, purchased
security for his regime by maintaining a large, poorlyequipped and ill-trained military. However, that military
provided little benefit to the society as a whole: it preyed
upon Zaire’s long-suffering populace and provided no
security from external aggression. The army of Mobutu’s
successors displays many of the same characteristics. In
greater or lesser degree, the same holds true for a number of
African countries.
Perhaps the most common thread linking the more
professional African armed forces is the presence of a
well-resourced professional military education system for
officers, at least up to Staff College level. (Some countries,
like Botswana, have compensated for lack of in-country
schools by concerted efforts to send officers abroad for such
training.) Judging by the output, investment in
professional military education seems to provide a good
return on defense spending by African countries.45
Ideas for the Future.
A variety of institutions in Africa and abroad are active
in encouraging security sector reform. These have included
institutions like the South African Institute for Security
Studies and Centre for Defense Management (University of
Witwatersrand) which provide training programs, publish
materials, and organize conferences and exchanges.
They also include such non-African organizations as the
(U.S.) Overseas Development Council, involved in a very
promising study of ways in which foreign donors can better
assist reform. (An ongoing project sponsored by the United
Kingdom’s Department for International Development has
offered considerable insight into requirements for security
sector reform in the developing world.46)
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Issues of defense funding in Africa ultimately boil down
to issues of legitimacy and governance. At its heart are
three basic questions: First, what is “security” for a given
society and who has the prerogative to define it? Second,
how does the need for “security” relate to the society’s other
priorities, and who has the right to decide that? Third, how
are the allocation and expenditure of resources overseen to
assure that the society obtains the right amount of security,
no more or less, without waste or abuse? These are profound
questions that confront all societies, and the answers
almost inevitably are complex and ambiguous.
African countries face two particularly challenging
problems relating to these decisions: poverty, and weak or
absent democratic institutions. Both problems have obvious
implications for internal security. Resources are
constrained for any national priority—including security.
At the same time, African states generally have not
achieved the mechanisms for establishing a sound
consensus on the nature and degree of security desired by
the populace. This significantly undermines the legitimacy
of the state—and its security sector—in the eyes of the
general population. So the remaining question is not so
much, “How much should we spend?” Rather, it is “What,
exactly, are we trying to buy?”
Although hardly original to this monograph, it
nonetheless is worth observing that an increase in economic
strength and economic opportunity in African countries is
critically important to attenuating significant internal
security threats. At the same time, it is difficult to envision
achieving a national consensus on security, threats, and
national priorities in the absence of the kinds of
consultation typical of democratic government. So in the
absence of economic improvement and further democratic
transition, security reform continues to be problematical.
That said, a variety of measures exist that could improve
the coherence and value of defense spending in Africa. An
obvious one would be to better distribute the responsibility
24

for the armed forces among institutions of government, to
prevent the accumulation of too many prerogatives in too
few hands. Many African countries feature at least some
responsibility on the part of the national legislature for
allocation (or oversight) of defense spending. However,
parliaments often do not have the expertise, or the
independence from the executive branch, to perform this
role adequately. Clearly, assistance to parliaments in
performing such roles is appropriate.47
It is important to establish a dialogue among security
force officials, civil society, and those responsible in national
governments for the allocation and oversight of resources.
This will enable the civilian public servants to better
understand the valid concerns of professionals regarding
security force needs.48 It particularly is important that
parliamentarians acquire expertise in oversight and
monitoring of defense funding.
However, distribution of responsibility for overseeing
security force spending also might be a fruitful area for
African innovation. It is conceivable that an African
solution to this problem could take the form of independent
regulatory commissions of professionals (somewhat like the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration) separate from the
executive and legislative branches of government, but
responsible in some ways to each.
One of the most useful measures would be the institution
of a process that created and maintained a national security
strategy. This process would identify and prioritize national
interests, assess threats to the national interests, and select
appropriate policies to attenuate threats and advance
interests. It is, of course, more preferable that this occurs
prior to an identification of roles and missions for the
security services. One result of this process may be to
determine that some resources now devoted to the military
might be better spent on law enforcement agencies, or vice
versa. Another result could be a much better determination
of the appropriate roles for national intelligence agencies.
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Several African countries are engaged in efforts to develop
national security strategies.
Efforts to increase the legitimacy and relevance of the
security sector in the eyes of the general public would be a
wise investment. For the armed forces themselves, this
could involve use of military assets for such roles as medical
treatment of civilians, construction of infrastructure in
remote areas, and rapid-response disaster assistance.49 But
there is no substitute for maintenance of a well-trained,
well-disciplined professional military establishment,
oriented against discernible security threats, whose
personnel have a strong commitment to human rights and
ethical use of national resources. This is recognized by
Africans inside and outside the security sector.50
Another important measure would be efforts to make the
defense funding, defense allocation, and procurement
processes open and transparent. Preferably, this would be
accompanied by a very public debate on the roles and
missions of the security services. It also would help to assure
that the decisions about defense spending follow the same
processes—subject to the same rules and oversight—as the
funding of other sectors. This would be much facilitated by
government efforts to encourage and court the independent
press. It also would be helped by a full public sector
commitment to anti-corruption efforts.
The transparency and competence of security force
expenditures would be enhanced by adoption of sound
business management techniques within organizations or
ministries charged with allocation and oversight. This
would include stringent fiscal discipline and accountability.
The effort also would be much enhanced by multi-year
planning and budgeting on the part of security forces. In the
long run, such measures would enable African military
establishments to overcome some of the problems inherent
in lack of resources. The skills involved, however, are not
easily acquired. Education of qualified personnel—military
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and civilian—is very important. Giving qualified personnel
the autonomy to perform these functions is essential.
If African military establishments are employed in
“nontraditional” roles—such as regional humanitarian
assistance or support to internal anticrime police
operations—the additional resource requirements should
be subject to coherent planning and budgeting processes.
Employment in nontraditional roles poses problems to any
military establishment, and can significantly undermine
the capacity to perform the primary function.51
African military establishments have made
considerable efforts to find educational opportunities for
their personnel. Here again, they have been impeded by
limited resources and are subject to the whims of donors.
But a commitment to education is a wise investment of
limited resources. In the long run, it can result in much
enhanced military capability and professionalism, as
evident in such military establishments as those of
Botswana, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal. African efforts to
obtain such education for their military professionals
should be commended and assisted.
However, the need for the education of military
professionals is matched by the need to provide education on
security issues to civilian public servants in all branches of
government. There is a significant need for institutions like
the (U.S.) John F. Kennedy School of Government that could
provide graduate-level training for mid-level African civil
and military leaders, preferably in mixed groups from all
over the continent and preferably focused on African issues
and solutions.
Finally, it may be very productive for African countries
to continue—and enhance—efforts to seek subregional
answers to pressing security problems. This certainly may
reduce the sources of regional insecurity. But it may also
provide options that somewhat mitigate the lack of
resources in individual African countries.52 For instance,
the East African Community has worked on plans to
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integrate the military officer training of Kenya, Tanzania,
and Uganda, allowing each country to specialize in different
levels of training for the whole community. The Southern
African Development Community has established a
regional peacekeeping training facility in Zimbabwe.
Conceivably, the same sort of rationalization could be
applied to military forces of individual countries—one
specializing in a certain capability, a second in another. The
same could be applied to procurement of some military
materiel.
The important thesis to this whole discussion is that
defense spending in Africa should be viewed as the tail of a
very long chain. An African society will not realize the value
of resources devoted to defense unless it first features the
kind of democratic consultation that allows the entire
society to define its interests and priorities—including
security. This process should occur before establishing the
roles and missions of the security services based upon what
the society can afford. Then, it is important to establish
mechanisms that assure the security services are
accountable for performing their designated roles and for
wisely using resources allocated to them. Finally, the
allocation itself should be sufficient to allow the security
forces to perform their designated roles.
Conclusion: The Role of the U.S. Department
of Defense.
A primary focus of American security policy in Africa is
to assist local partners in their efforts to build stable,
accountable governments and effective security
institutions. Although the U.S. military may be called to
participate in humanitarian relief, peace operations, or
noncombatant evacuation operations in Africa, its main
current role is to assist with professionalization and reform.
The longest-standing effort in this vein is the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program that
provides U.S. military training (mainly in U.S. military
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schools) to African military students. (In Fiscal Year 2000,
the United States allocated $3.9 million for IMET
programs, involving some 1,364 personnel from 35
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.53) Much of the IMET
training involves relatively junior officers who apply their
skills at the tactical level. A relative handful of senior
African officers attend U.S. senior service colleges where
strategic planning and defense budgeting form a
substantial part of the curriculum. A few African officers
also attend courses such as those offered by the U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School that emphasize civil-military
relations, defense budgeting and military justice.
Another significant U.S. professionalization program
also is targeted at the tactical level in African armies. The
African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) provides military
forces up to brigade size with skills necessary for peace
operations. (As of July 2001, nine African countries had
agreed to participate in ACRI, and the United States had
active programs with five of these.54) Rules of engagement,
relations with civilians, and professional conduct in general
form an important part of this training.
If the United States is going to make a significant,
long-term impact on reform of the security sector in African
countries, it must devote substantial attention to the
capabilities and professional inclinations of policymakers
(both civilian and military) at the strategic level. This
attention should include a focus on civil-military relations,
strategic planning and security sector budgeting.
To assist African states in efforts to improve the
accountability and effectiveness of defense budgeting, DoD
should undertake several related activities. The first and
most important is to continue support for and development
of the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS).
Founded on the DoD Regional Center concept (under which
four other institutes now operate), the Africa Center
complements other U.S., African, and multinational
programs on the continent.55 ACSS seeks to enhance the
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professional skills of Africa’s civilian and military leaders.
Its programs support democratic governance in Africa by
offering senior African civilian and military leaders
rigorous academic and practical programs in civil-military
relations, national security strategy, and defense
economics.
ACSS participants include military officers, government
officials, and nongovernmental civilian leaders. The Center
promotes informed and productive inquiry on the military’s
role in a democracy. It encourages its participants to assess
the importance of civilian control and military
professionalism in democracies and examine civil-military
relations in formulating and executing national security
strategy. It also endeavors to promote an understanding of
the military’s role shaped and shared by African societies,
their governments, and their military establishments.
U.S. attention to Africa often vacillates and the future of
ACSS is not assured. However, U.S. national interests in
Africa are likely to grow in the future, and relatively small
investments in programs like ACSS can have a large payoff.
DoD should sustain its support and continue to explore
ways to further develop the Center and augment its
effectiveness.
With ACSS in the lead, DoD should help publish an
international journal designed to help African defense
professionals exchange ideas on strategy development,
defense budgeting, and building healthy civil-military
relations. European nations involved in African security
could be partners in this endeavor. Along the same lines,
DoD should sponsor an annual workshop for Africans
involved in defense budgeting to provide a forum for
communication and exchange. Finally, DoD should take the
lead in an interagency effort to establish a system of
internships in Washington for Africans involved in defense
budgeting. These interns could serve on congressional
staffs, in the Congressional Budget Office, in the Office of
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Management and Budget, and in the Pentagon’s budget
offices. Such hands-on experience could be invaluable.
Whatever programs the U.S Government sponsors, they
will not be a panacea for the shortcomings of security sector
financing in Africa. But there are low cost ways of giving the
region some essential tools it needs to continue reform and
the movement toward greater security and stability. Over
the long term, these could play an important role in
promoting the security interests both of the United States
and of its African partners.
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